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Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to analyse how niche parties influence mainstream 
parties’ strategies on the local level. The municipal election of Gothenburg 2018 is 
used as the case for the study. As material, the thesis used budget directives presented 
in the city council and opinion articles.  
 
Theory: The position, saliency, and ownership theory.  
Method: Quantitative Content Analysis.  
Result: The thesis found evidence that suggests that local parties influence mainstream 
parties. These results are similar to those on the national level. However, these effects 
seem to depend on the issue and on the party itself. While valence issues elicit 
“accommodating” responses, reactions of mainstream parties on positional issues tend 
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In recent years, more and more niche parties have entered the political stage and successfully challenged 
traditional mainstream parties (Wagner 2011). Their entrance, as well as their actions, has reshaped both 
politics and the mainstream parties themselves. By reshaping politics, niche parties have been able to 
make specific issues such as the environment and immigration more salient in the political debate 
(Dahlström and Sundell 2012). Their success has also forced the mainstream parties to change positions 
on specific policies, essentially changing party strategy (Meguid 2008, 236). Niche parties has thus 
widened the debate in politics.  
At the same time, these actors also represent a new type of citizen, as their voters usually have different 
values compared to those voting for mainstream parties (Dalton 2014; Ford and Jennings 2020). As 
such, these niche parties can be viewed as a driver of change in society.  
Research on mainstream parties’ reaction towards niche parties is not new but as I argue below mostly 
focuses on the national level. There are some studies concerning second-order elections – such as the 
elections to the European Parliament – but at the local level similar research is practically non-existent. 
This is an unfortunate lapse in the literature since niche parties operate at both levels and frequently 
their success at the subnational level may even spill over to the national (Meijers 2017; Otjes 2020). In 
addition, the local lever is where the voter first encounter politics (Gross and Jankowski 2020), and some 
of the most important challenges of our time (e.g., regarding climate change or healthcare) cannot be 
addressed without successful engagement with political and societal actors at the local level.  
In this thesis I contribute to research on party competition and more specifically on niche party success 
and mainstream party reaction. In the 2018 municipal election in Gothenburg, the niche party the 
Democrats managed to gain almost 17% of the vote (Valmyndigheten 2018). Created in 2017, the 
Democrats campaigned on issues that were unconventional, mainly infrastructure and changes to public 
administration (Andersson et al 2018; Wannholt et al 2017). The party managed to rewrite the political 
map in the city of Gothenburg, a city that historically has been dominated by the mainstream parties 
(Gunnarsson 2011; Valmyndigheten 2020). Do mainstream parties at the local level react to niche parties 
and change their strategies accordingly? If they do, when are these changes visible and what shape do 
they take? Using the local elections of 2018 in Gothenburg municipality as a case study, I answer these 
questions by testing previously established theories that have been applied to the national level. This is 
done through a quantitative content analysis of budget proposals as outlined in the method section below.  
I present evidence that suggests that local niche parties influence mainstream parties’ issue saliency. 
These results are similar to those obtained by studies done at the national level. However, as I discuss 
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in the final sections of the thesis, these effects seem to depend on the issue itself. While valence issues 
elicit “accommodating” responses, reactions of mainstream parties on more “positional” issues tend to 
be more muted.  
The thesis starts with a literature review in which I present the findings of previous studies. This is 
followed by a section that introduces the thesis’ theory, its case, and hypotheses. Afterwards, the 
methodology is introduced, in this case a quantitative content analysis. In the same section I’ll also 
discuss the material and codes. This is followed by the results. The final sections of the thesis consist of 
the discussion and conclusion. In the conclusion, I will also discuss the limitations of the thesis, and 





Background and previous research  
Research dealing with parties’ policy shifts has a long tradition (Downs 1957; Enelow and Hinich 1984). 
Parties shift policy positions for two main external reasons. The first is to respond to shifts in public 
opinion (Spoon and Klüver 2014; Pereira 2019; Ford and Jennings 2020). From a spatial competition 
perspective, public opinion has a strong influence over political parties’ policy positions. Parties adapt 
to the opinion climate and move along different policy dimensions in ways that can be electorally 
advantageous. In the second case, parties switch or alter their positions in order to respond to their rivals, 
i.e., other parties in the political system. Research in this field has a long history and has focused on 
many different parts of competition. Early studies focused on how parties positioned themselves on 
policy issues. These studies used theories based on spatial competition (Meguid 2008, 14; Austen-Smith 
2011, 811). Today, studies focus on how parties persuade voters to vote for them, usually through direct 
proposals and promises (Wren and McElwain 2009, 371).  
A concept developed inside this field is the notion of party-system agenda. That is, the hierarchy of 
issues that is the most important at a given time. The party-system agenda doesn’t simply put focus on 
internal structures of a specific party (e.g., ideology and/or organisation). It also focuses on the 
behaviour of its competitors (Abou-Chadi et al 2020, 751). As Abou-Chadi and his colleagues writes:  
“The notion of a party-system agenda highlights how the actions of an individual party cannot 
merely be explained by studying the party itself and the electorate; it is also necessary to consider 
the behaviour of the other parties in the party system” (Abou-Chadi et al 2020, 751). 
This factor will be the focal point of this study and the object of review in this section. More specifically, 
I’m interested in how new or “niche” entrants in the political competition affect the positioning of 
“mainstream” parties and their implications.  
 
Party strategy vis a vis other parties  
Parties shift their stances in response to policy movements done by rival parties. As an example, research 
finds that parties respond to electoral outcomes and adopt similar positions on the issues of the winning 
party (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009). Parties also react towards their closest rivals, as it’s common 
for parties that are in the same ideological families to follow the movements of their “neighbours” in the 
policy space, i.e. when a social democratic party changes position, a leftist party will follow (Adams 
and Somer-Topcu 2009, 826, 842; Abou-Chadi and Stoetzer 2020, 944). A large part of this research 
focuses on parties that are of equal size and have a long history. Called “mainstream parties”, these 
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parties are known to the voter and have been involved in day-to-day politics for a long time. Regardless 
of their dominant position in politics, mainstream parties are today facing new contenders that position 
themselves on issues not easily classified along the traditional Left-Right scale.  
These so called “niche” parties compete on issues that are sometimes named “New Politics” (compared 
to the “Old Politics” championed by the mainstream parties), which go beyond policy disagreements on 
the socialism-liberalism axis (Dalton 2014 ,179; Ford and Jennings 2020, 307 – 308) 1. Instead, these 
parties focus on non-economic issues, such as immigration, minority rights or the climate (Dalton 2014, 
143). Furthermore, niche parties are newer, smaller, and more extreme in their opinions compared to 
mainstream parties. (Wagner 2011 ,860). During the last decades, niche parties have emerged on the 
political stage across the world, creating a “niche party phenomenon” (Wagner 2011, 860). Not only has 
this created a renewed interest in the literature regarding the definition and classification of this new 
party family, but it has also created a desire to understand how mainstream parties faced with new and 
successful contenders react (for example, Abou-Chadi 2016; Bale et al 2010; Rooduijn et al 2014). 
Especially since the electoral future of niche parties depend to a great extent on mainstream parties’ 
strategies vis a vis that success.  
Research has shown that mainstream parties are influenced by the success of niche parties (Rooduijn et 
al 2014; Heinze 2018).  It’s also widely understood that: “Niche party fortunes are, in many respects, 
the by-products of competition between mainstream parties” (Meguid 2008, 22). However, mainstream 
parties are not simply “copycats” that adopt the exact same position as the niche party. Depending on 
the situation and context, mainstream parties can use different strategies toward niche parties.  
In general, mainstream parties can deploy three different strategies when dealing with a niche party: An 
accommodative strategy; an adversarial strategy; and a dismissive strategy (Meguid 2005; Meguid 
2008). Mainstream parties use an accommodative strategy when they try to draw voters from the new 
party by incorporating a similar position on the issue and “converging” towards the challenger’s position 
(Meguid 2008, 24). The second strategy developed is the opposite of policy convergence. This is an 
adversarial strategy, meaning that a mainstream party takes a rival stance on the issue compared to the 
 
1 Whereas traditional issues are often placed on an economic dimension, the new issues concern issues 
that are non-economic. These shifts in the dimensionality of electoral competition are driven by 
structural changes: Increased educational levels among the population; Increased ethnic diversity as a 
result of mass migration; Deeper generational divides as a result of an aging population; and increased 
polarization between major cities and rural towns (Ford and Jennings 2020, 307 – 308). While these 
are important elements in the study of party competition it’s not the focal point of this thesis.  
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niche party. The third strategy, called a dismissive strategy, is one in which the mainstream party simply 
tries to ignore the issues of the niche party (Meguid 2008, 24). Instead of focusing and communicating 
their stance on the same issues as the niche party, the mainstream party puts its focus on a completely 
different issue.  
These strategies can be used differently by mainstream parties (Bale et al 2010; Rooduijn et al 2014). 
There is no “default position” that can be adopted by mainstream parties. Instead, these strategies are 
often based on what issue is more salient in a given election.  
Thus, the mainstream party’s response is dependent on what kind of niche party it’s facing and what 
issue the niche party is campaigning on (Schumacher and van Kersbergen 2016, 309; Akkerman 2015, 
63). For example, these responses – i.e., the strategies – are different if the niche party is green or radical 
right. When reacting towards radical right parties, mainstream parties tend to be more anti-immigrant 
and culturally protectionist, deploying an accommodative strategy (Abou-Chadi and Werner 2018, 843). 
When the niche party is a Green party, the reaction is different. Instead of trying to draw voters away 
from the niche party by emphasizing the same issues, the mainstream party de-emphasize the 
environmental issue, using a dismissive strategy (Abou-Chadi 2014, 433).  
These choices are also contextual. For example, it’s more common for the mainstream parties in Sweden 
to disengage from the niche party, whereas in Norway it’s more common to engage (Heinze 2018, 303). 
This highlights the importance of the context the parties act inside. One of the reasons behind this 
difference in response is the culture of a unified strategy amongst the Swedish mainstream parties 
towards niche parties (Heinze 2018, 303). In Norway, this culture was absent. Furthermore, in Sweden 
issues favouring the mainstream parties were more salient compared to those in Norway (Heinze 2018, 
303).  
These actions further bolster niche parties’ appeals. If a mainstream party tries to adopt a similar policy 
position as a niche party, this carries positive implications for the legitimacy and perceived competence 
of these actors (Down and Han 2020, 1406). The actions of mainstream parties also influence policy. In 
the long run, mainstream party reactions towards niche parties can influence specific policy outcomes, 
such as trade policy (Camyar 2012 ,403). 
At the same time, the strategies used by mainstream parties affects the levels of electoral support for the 
niche parties (Meguid 2005, 357). The kind of strategy used by the mainstream party can either facilitate 
or disrupt electoral success for the niche party. Evidence suggests that if a mainstream party takes a 
tough stance towards immigration it facilitates success for anti-immigration parties (Dahlström and 
Sundell 2012, 361). By taking a tougher stance on the issue, the mainstream parties send a signal towards 
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the voters that the niche party is right in their stance on the issue, which makes it “easier” for the voter 
to vote for the original “owners” of the issue. This facilitates short-term support for the niche party.  
 
When do mainstream parties change their positions 
As shown mainstream parties have a variety of strategies at their disposal as they respond to niche 
parties. But when do they do it? Parties are usually reactive, meaning they act after an election. This 
notion is contested, as some authors argue that the effect coming from niche parties are immediate 
(Schumacher and van Kersbergen 2016 ,309). Even so, several studies point towards that parties change 
position after the results of an election is known (Somer-Topcu 2009; Fagerholm 2016, 504; Abou-
Chadi and Stoetzer 2020, 944). These studies highlight the need for information. In an uncertain 
environment, political parties rely on cues coming from the public opinion. Perhaps the most accurate 
source of information comes from elections, and past election results (Somer-Topcu 2009, 246). This 
includes a temporal dimension, as it’s almost impossible for parties to act upon election results until 
after the election. Thus, it becomes possible to analyse any changes in policy positions first after an 
election (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009, 690). 
Another source of information for political parties is opinion polls. Research shows that parties are also 
prone to the attitudes of the public opinion as they use opinion polls during campaigns to assess what 
the voters think about their policies (Pereira 2019, 84; Schumacher and Öhberg 2020, 5). However, 
opinion polls are always shifting as citizens change their views on what they deem important when 
conducting the opinion surveys. Therefore, elections serve as a more secure source of information for 
mainstream parties (Van Der Velden et al 2018 ,408). 
The strategical reasons behind a shift in policy for political parties are several. One major argument 
behind why a party should shift policy is that a loss in electoral support is an indication that the public 
opinion favours other issues (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009, 690). It’s hard to believe that a party that 
has campaigned on a certain issue and who lost a significant number of votes in the same election would 
stick with the same strategy after the election. Recent papers support this statement and have found that 
political parties are sensitive to voter volatility and dealignment: If you lose votes due to your issue not 
being perceived as important by the electorate, you will change your strategy and what issues you 
prioritize (Dassonneville 2018 ,822: Spoon and Klüver 2014, 48). These results are also visible when a 
niche party has gained a lot of votes in an election at the same time as a mainstream party has lost votes, 
which indicates a desire for the mainstream party politicians to change their policies in accordance with 
the public (Butler et al 2017, 1975). 
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Mainstream Party Strategy in Second-order elections 
The literature above concerns cases on the national level. However, niche parties also compete in 
second-order elections, such as the elections for the European parliament. Research shows that the same 
results witnessed on the national level are also visible in second-order elections. For example, if 
Eurosceptic parties are successful in the European elections, it will influence mainstream parties, making 
them more sceptical towards the European Union (Meijers 2017 ,420). Voters might use second-order 
elections as a tool to get the attention of the mainstream parties. Studies find that voters might vote for 
parties in second-order elections to give cues to mainstream parties about the issues salient to them 
Lindstam 2019, 10). This is done by voters that don’t feel adequately represented on specific issues by 
the mainstream parties. At the same time, parties also use second-order elections – such as the European 
elections – to evaluate and change their policy platforms on the national level (Somer-Topcu and Zar 
2014, 893). As the literature above shows, even though they are called “second-order”, elections on 
levels other than the national are important for political parties in many ways.  
While previous studies have focused on how parties compete on the national and European levels, little 
is known about electoral competition on the local level, and how mainstream parties react to niche 
parties’ competition. In some regions in Italy for example, the number of non-partisan parties has 
increased in the last couple of years (Vampa 2016, 593). Local politics play an important role in the 
lives of citizens. It’s the first type of politics the citizens approach, be it legislative, administrative or in 
local issues such as infrastructure or education. Nevertheless, the scientific study of political parties’ 
policy position change at the local level is sparse. Compared to the national level, it’s often hard to find 
material and data on the positions of local parties (Gross and Jankowski 2020), and the methods used 
on the national level aren’t always suitable for the local arena. In the latter case, the politics aren’t the 
same. For example, there is no foreign policy being debated on the local level. Instead, other issues are 
more important, such as education, policing or infrastructure.  
At the same time, local politics get more and more politicized, further increasing the need for academic 
focus on the subject (Gross and Jankowski 2020). Some scientists believe that the increased support for 
independent local parties can spill over to the national arena, leading to a decline in support for the 
established parties as the different options for the voters increase (Otjes 2020, 105 – 106).  
The reasons behind the emergence of parties like these are many. Some scientists believe that distrust 
towards established parties makes voters seek for a new alternative (Otjes 2018, 322), others believe 
that local activism can be triggered by resurfacing conflicts between the local community and the state 
(Åberg and Ahlberger 2015, 818). Independent parties on the local level – that is, parties that are not 
part of an ideological family, such as Left or Right – also introduce new conflict lines to the voters, 
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which might give them an advantage when debating local issues compared to their mainstream 
counterparts (Boogers and Voerman 2010, 88). Localness also matters for a candidate running for higher 
office, as it works as a cue for voters who lack other forms of influential information (Jankowski 2016, 
81). 
Electoral competition therefore is not exclusive to the national level. It also occurs on the local level. 
The increased politization of local politics has made the local elections more competitive, as it has 
increased the number of issues the parties campaign and debate on. Studies that analyse how mainstream 
parties cope with these changes and new contenders at the local level are needed. Is there a shift visible 
in the positions taken by the mainstream parties? What kind of strategies do they use when coping with 
a new competitor on the local level? This thesis aims to fill the aforementioned gap in local party 





Theory and hypotheses 
This section will develop the hypotheses on the thesis. These will be based on the literature above and 
will concern two different topics: 1) The timing of the shifts in policy positions, and 2) what type of 
strategy is used during this shift.  
 
Election results and changes in strategy 
As mentioned above, these switches in policy usually come after an election. Election results give the 
parties secure information about the preferences of the public (Somer-Topcu 2009; Fagerholm 2016, 
504; Abou-Chadi and Stoetzer 2020, 944). In this sense, political parties are backward looking actors 
that evaluate past performances in elections (Van Der Velden et al 2018 ,408). It’s implausible that 
political parties will stick to a strategy that made them loose votes in an election ((Dassonneville 2018 
,822: Spoon and Klüver 2014, 48). Furthermore, niche parties usually gain votes when mainstream 
parties loose votes (Butler et al 2017, 1975), which gives strategical weight behind a change in strategy 
for the mainstream parties.  
After the results of an election is known, and if the party lost votes compared to the previous election, 
there is a likelihood that the losing party will shift positions on certain issues. Elections thereby play an 
important part when parties change their strategies. The first expectation coming from this thesis is that 
parties on the local level are also influenced by the election results, and that eventual changes in strategy 
will come after an election. Thus, the first hypothesis of the thesis is: 
- H1: Mainstream parties, faced with a successful challenger at the local level will adjust their 
policy positions – i.e., develop a new strategy – after an election. 
To understand not only when but also how mainstream parties might react, a theory focusing on party 
strategy is needed. One such theory can be found in Meguid’s “position, saliency and ownership theory” 
(PSO) (Meguid 2008, 22). I explore expectations coming from this theory in the next section.  
 
The position, saliency and ownership theory 
Early theories of party behaviour argued that the political party adapted itself to the preferences of the 
citizens (Wren and McElwain 2009, 371). Thus, the changes in party policies are influenced by the 
median voter. Meguid expands this understanding by including other parties in the influencing-process. 
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When faced with competitors who campaigns on new issue dimensions, mainstream parties must make 
decisions whether to enter on this dimension and compete for voters (Meguid 2008, 28).  
First of the strategies is the accommodative strategy. It explains how mainstream parties tries to draw 
voters from the niche party by moving closer to their policy positions. This is sometimes called policy 
convergence (Meguid 2008, 24). The second strategy is the opposite of the first. An adversarial strategy 
is applied by a party that wants to move away from its contender. This is sometimes referred to as policy 
divergence (Meguid 2008, 24).  
The difference between an adversarial or accommodative strategy is whether the party wants to adopt 
the same policies as the competitor. With an accommodative strategy, the mainstream party converge 
on the issue with the niche party, essentially trying to take the policy positions on the issue dimension. 
An example would be that if a niche party wins a lot of support by advocating for reduced taxes, the 
mainstream party adopts this position with an accommodative strategy by also calling for lower taxes. 
By doing so, the mainstream party tries to undermine the niche party on the issue. With an adversarial 
strategy, the mainstream party tries to take a position that is the opposite of the niche party. Reusing the 
example about taxes, with an adversarial strategy, the mainstream party would instead call for higher 
taxes, thus taking a position that is the direct opposite of the niche party.  
The two strategies above come with an increase in saliency for a specific issue. When mainstream parties 
decide to compete on a new issue dimension – regardless if it’s with an accommodative or adversarial 
strategy – they decide to make the issue more salient by communicating a position on the issue. In the 
British election period of 1977 – 1979, the saliency of the decentralization issue, put forward by the 
Scottish National Party (SNP), increased when the mainstream parties Labour and the Conservatives 
deployed an accommodative and adversarial strategy respectively (Meguid 2008, 236).  
However, mainstream parties can also decide to focus on other issues, taking a decision not to compete 
on the new issue dimension. The third strategy developed in the PSO-theory is called a dismissive 
strategy (Meguid 2008, 28). In a dismissive strategy, the mainstream party simply tries to ignore the 
issues of the niche party. By not competing on the issue, the mainstream party tries to defuse the issue 
favoured by the niche party, signalling to the voters that the issue is not important. This is usually done 
by not communicating any position on the issue at all. The mainstream party communicates instead their 
positions on other issues. Once again reusing the example with taxes, instead of taking any position on 
the issue, with a dismissive strategy the mainstream party would instead try to highlight another issue, 
for example climate change.  
Through a dismissive strategy, the issue becomes less salient. This is because the mainstream party 
doesn’t compete on the dimension due to strategical reasons. When a mainstream party uses a dismissive 
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strategy, the issue usually drops in importance for the public opinion. This was seen in the British 
electoral cycle of 1970 – 1973, when the Labour and Conservative parties both used dismissive 
strategies, effectively reducing the national interest in the previous mentioned decentralization issue 
(Meguid 2008, 232).  
In the cases with the British elections above, the choices behind accommodative, adversarial or 
dismissive strategies were based on the perceived threat of the niche party. When the niche party in 
these cases, the SNP, were perceived as a threat, the mainstream parties used accommodative or 
adversarial strategies to try to counter its success. When the SNP were viewed not to be a contender for 
votes (as in the period 1970 – 1973), the mainstream parties used dismissive strategies (Meguid 2008, 
246). Consequently, the issue of decentralization (which the SNP campaigned on) decreased in saliency 
with the dismissive strategies (Meguid 2008, 232) and increased with the accommodative and 
adversarial strategies (Meguid 2008, 236). 
 
How the theory will be used 
The part relevant for this thesis is the one about issue saliency. When faced with a new contender, 
mainstream parties need to decide how to deal with it. As mentioned above, they can apply an 
accommodative, adversarial or dismissive strategy. With an accommodative or adversarial strategy, the 
mainstream parties put more emphasis on the issue. With a dismissive, the mainstream party puts less 
emphasis on the issue.  
In this study, it will be difficult to analyse the different positions of the parties, and whether the strategies 
are accommodative or adversarial. There are various reasons for doing so. First, there are time 
constrains. A study that analyses differences in tone (essentially accommodative or dismissive tone) 
towards an issue requires more time compared to one that analyses whether a party engages or not with 
the issue.  
More importantly though, when analysing differences in tone, there are reliability concerns that come 
into play. This problem occurs when the coder needs to interpret different arguments as negative or 
positive towards a proposal. Not only does this add to the time problem by increasing the amount of 
time needed for the coding, but it also increases the chances of coding inconsistently. To avoid problems 
like these, one can apply a statistical reliability test. As this thesis only has one coder, it becomes 
impossible to conduct statistical reliability tests. To avoid these problems described above, this thesis 
has made the decision to focus on whether the mainstream parties engage on an issue conflict or not, 
i.e., if they make the issue more or less salient.  
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However, as I will show, one of the issues “owned” by the niche party, potentially lends itself in a more 
detailed analysis that can differentiate between accommodative or adversarial strategies by mainstream 
parties. In the results section I proceed with caution in such an analysis that does produce some 
interesting findings.  
To decide whether a party has engaged or not in an issue, the dismissive strategy from the PSO-theory, 
together with what I term here as an engagement strategy will be used. The engagement strategy is the 
accommodative and adversarial strategy put into one. If a mainstream party puts more emphasis on an 
issue campaigned on by the niche party, they have used the engagement strategy, essentially taking a 
position (for or against) the issue. This also means that the amount of policy proposals and saliency of 
specific issues increased since the last election 
On the other hand, if the amount of policy proposals instead has decreased, the mainstream party has 
used a dismissive strategy.  As explained in the methodology section, by analysing the budget proposals 
by the parties, the study is going to count and categorize different policy proposals alongside selected 
issues. Thus, the theory will explain the eventual shifts in policy focus among the mainstream parties.  
The table below summarizes the different strategies. 
Table 1: Mainstream party strategies 
Engagement strategy More salience is put on the issue after the 
election, the mainstream party tries to compete 
with the niche party on the issue by either 
converging on or diverging from the niche party’s 
position. 
Dismissive strategy Less salience is put on the issue after the election, 
the mainstream party tries to ignore the issue. 
 
The above sets up two competitive expectations regarding the behaviour of mainstream parties:  
- H2A: Mainstream parties on the local level will respond to the success of niche parties by 
engaging with the issue emphasized by the niche parties on their policy proposals. 
The other strategy is dismissive, meaning the mainstream party tries to limit support for the niche party 
by making the issue less visible. The literature tells us that new and upcoming Green parties often face 
this type of strategy. The competing expectation, therefore, is that niche parties on the local level will 
face this type of strategy as well. The second hypothesis of the thesis is: 
13 
- H2B: Mainstream parties on the local level will respond to the success of niche parties by 




On a national level in 2018, the two biggest parties the Social Democrats and the Moderate Party both 
lost votes. This resulted in that for the first time in Swedish history they didn’t gather more than half of 
the total vote (Aylott and Bolin 2018, 1513).  
The national results were somewhat reflected in the local election in Gothenburg. The Social Democrats 
and the Moderate Party lost votes compared to the election before, especially the Moderates. The clear 
winner of the election was a newfound party, the Democrats, that gained almost 17% of the vote in their 
first election (Valmyndigheten 2018). This election – the local election in Gothenburg 2018 – is the 
selected case for this thesis. The newly founded Democrats managed to persuade the voters and enter 
the city council. 
In Sweden there have been cases of new challengers on the local level that forces the established parties 
to change their strategies (Dahlström and Esaiasson 2011; Dahlström and Sundell 2012). However, these 
parties have mainly campaigned on reduced immigration. Leading up to the election, the public opinion 
in Gothenburg found the infrastructure to be the most important question. It has been an issue that has 
been in the centre in the city’s politics for some time (Andersson et al 2018, 132). This was partly based 
on the opposition to a national infrastructure agreement called Västlänken or The West Link Project. 
According to some political analysts, it was the single most important issue in the election (Näslund 
2019; Dahlström 2017). In 2018, the attitudes were almost the same: The infrastructure remained the 
most important issue for the public. Apart from infrastructure, integration, public health, law and order, 
social issues and education were the highest ranked issues for the public in Gothenburg 2018 (SOM 
2019, 20). 
At the same time, confidence in politicians has declined in Sweden for the recent years This is also 
visible in Gothenburg with a majority of the population in Gothenburg that has little confidence in 
politicians. Compared to the national level, the trust towards politicians in Gothenburg is lower (SOM 
2019, 20; SOM 2019; Andersson et al 2018, 134). This context could indicate an environment in which 
established politicians are rejected by the citizenry. Instead, the citizens might look for new alternatives 
like the Democrats. Thus, the reduced trust in politicians, together with the infrastructure issue and the 
preferences of the public opinion created an election campaign that focused on local issues. 
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The Democrats 
To this backdrop, the Democrats were formed in 2017 with an outspoken goal to stop The West Link 
Project (Wannholt et al 2017). Their stance on the issue was unconventional compared to the other 
parties as no mainstream party was against the project (Dahlström 2017). Instead, the Democrats 
represented a clear option against the continuation of the agreement, and seemingly had the public 
opinion on their side.  
Another issue the Democrats campaigned on, and that made it different compared to other parties, was 
its position on public administration. Apart from putting a stop to the Västlänken-project, the Democrats 
wanted to restructure the public administration of Gothenburg, and to improve its governance. 
Furthermore, they wanted to reduce the local corruption and change the bureaucratic system (Andersson 
et al 2018, 129). The party also wanted to streamline the public organisation and redistribute 1.4 million 
Swedish kronor in the municipal administration (SVT Nyheter 2018). During a public questioning days 
before the election, the party leader Martin Wannholt said that the politicians in the city “didn’t do their 
job” and therefore, a streamlining of the organisation was needed (Rogsten 2018). The party also wanted 
to remove the role of political secretary for the political parties in the city (Wannholt et al 2018).  
After the election, as the party was unable to stop the West Link Project, the efficiency of the public 
administration has gained more focus for the Democrats (Herold 2019). In a debate article in 2018, the 
party outlined a plan for a restructuring of the civil service and public administration of Gothenburg 
(Wannholt et al 2018). Thus, the party takes a unique position on the issue of public administration. As 
a questionnaire from the Swedish public service shows, going into the election the mainstream parties 
focused on completely different issues (SVT Nyheter 2018). 
Due to their stances on policy issues, notably on infrastructure and public administration, the Democrats 
are viewed to be an adequate case for a thesis that wants to understand how niche party success affects 
mainstream party strategies. Given their immediate success, the Democrats become a suitable choice 
for a case-study (Esaiasson et al 2017, 109). Furthermore, the Democrats reach the criteria set up by 
Wagner when he writes that niche parties: 
“…can be defined as parties that compete primarily on a small number of non-economic issues, 
a definition that has the virtues of parsimony and measurability” (Wagner 2011 ,860). 
Following the concept put forward by Wagner, the Democrats are a niche party that primarily focuses 
on non-economic issues such as the infrastructure and the public administration. One might argue 
against this understanding, and instead advocate the position that public administration and 
infrastructure are economic issues. This is true to some degree. However, while these issues have an 
economic dimension to them, they´re not “typical” in the sense that they concern division on issues of 
16 
redistribution or privatisation. Instead, they concern the functioning of the local government and its 
structure and the continuation of an infrastructure agreement and its benefits on the city. Thus, these 
issues are understood as having a greater focus on the “restructuring sphere” of the public administration, 
and whether to continue with The West Link Project.  
The reduced trust in politicians, together with the infrastructure issue campaigned on by the Democrats 
and the public opinion created an election in which the Democrats could benefit by taking different 
positions on infrastructure and putting the issue of public administration in the agenda. This is also the 
focus of this study, as these issues will make up the arguments behind the selection of codes later in the 
thesis.  
 
The mainstream parties 
Moving on to the mainstream parties. The Moderate Party and the Social Democrats were chosen due 
to their dominance in Swedish politics. As Gunnarsson writes, they are part of the “pole parties” in 
Swedish politics, essentially passing the ruling power between themselves (Gunnarsson 2011, 85). 
Historically, the two parties have enjoyed the most votes in almost every national election since 1910 
(Statistics Sweden 2020). Regarding the Social Democrats, some academics go as far to argue that they 
have established a hegemony in the Swedish society (Möller 2015, 310). The two parties also represent 
different types of voters, were the Social Democrats are viewed as a mass party and the Moderates as 
an elite party (Norén Bretzer 2014, 82). Hence, the two parties give a good representation of Swedish 
politics.  
The same goes for the city of Gothenburg. For several years, the Moderates and Social Democrats have 
been the two largest parties (Valmyndigheten 2020), with the Social Democrats holding executive power 
for 24 years leading up to the election of 2018. Afterwards, the Moderates were able to create a coalition 
– the Alliance – and take control over the city. However, their losses in the election have made their 
coalition weak. In the 2018 election the support for the two mainstream parties declined, especially for 







The results from the previous elections are covered in the table below.  
Figure 1: Election results from the municipal elections in Gothenburg from 1998 up until 2018. All numbers 
are displayed in percentages. The results are taken from the Swedish Election Authority 
(Valmyndigheten.se).   
 
 
The historical dominant position of the Moderates and Social Democrats makes them interesting to 
study. Especially after the rise of the Democrats and the decline in support for the mainstream parties. 
In Gothenburg, it’s fair to say that the political map has been rewritten: There’s a new major player in 
town. Even if it’s too early to say whether the Democrats will remain in their current position (they 
might lose some of their support in the upcoming election) it’s still relevant to see whether their success 
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Methodology and codebook 
The material: political parties and their texts 
As Gunnarsson writes, political parties are a premise for a functional democracy. Without them, it 
becomes hard to imagine a modern democratic system. Perhaps the most important function of political 
parties is to design, propose and implement policy (Gunnarsson 2019, 5). Parties usually communicate 
their policy positions through their political and electoral manifestos. These are written with a strategic 
purpose: to win votes in elections. 
A strength when analysing party proposals such as manifestos is that they give a valid and reliable 
understanding of a party’s policy positions (Gunnarsson 2019, 91). For a study that has the ambition to 
analyse policy positions across time, manifestos (or equivalent documents as I will argue below) become 
a suitable fit. Furthermore, it’s plausible to assume that if a party finds a specific issue important, they 
will put a lot of emphasis on this issue in their manifestos. According to the saliency-theory (Gunnarsson 
2019, 96; Meguid 2008, 25), if a party finds an issue important, they want to campaign on that issue and 
make it salient for the voters. This means they are going to communicate their policy positions on this 
issue more frequently compared to other issues. As such, political manifestos work as credible source 
of information when analysing policy positions.  
It’s important to point out that this thesis doesn’t use political manifestos created for electoral 
campaigns. Instead, due to the lack of finding electoral documents for the local parties (for more, see 
Gross and Jankowski 2020), the thesis will use the budget directives put forward by political parties in 
the local parliament2. The budget directives in the city of Gothenburg doesn’t simply state how much 
money goes where, they also work as general plans for the coming years. The budget is the general and 
superior regulatory document for the city of Gothenburg, for its publicly owned companies and for its 
committees (Gothenburg City, 2020). On the webpage of the City of Gothenburg, one can read that: 
“The role of the budget is to state the municipal council’s prioritized goals and orientations within 
the financial framework and current legislation. Plans, programs, guidelines and policies adopted 
by the City Council must be followed and implemented, but are subordinate to the budget” 
(Gothenburg City 2020). 
Much like a political manifesto, the budget directives specify what the political parties want to 
accomplish during their mandate. Hence, a budget directive reflects salient political priorities for parties. 
 
2 There will be an exception to this which regards the year 2018 for the Democrats. This will be discussed further 
below.  
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As the quote above illustrates, it specifies political policies, plans, programs, and guidelines. 
Furthermore, it specifies which kind of issues – or policies –are important to the party. Much in line 
with the arguing of Gunnarsson, the budget directives thus work as strategic documents that prioritize 
goals and policies for the political parties. It’s a premiss for this study that the budget directives – just 
like a political manifesto – are strategical documents designed to communicate, among others, policy 
priorities (Gunnarsson 2019, 95). Thus, this thesis argues that the budget directives are a sufficient 
compensation for the lack of electoral manifestos.  
With a quantitative content analysis applied to budget directives it becomes possible to analyse what 
issues political parties find the most important. By including several directives across time, it becomes 
possible to track shifts in saliency of various issues.  
Much like the electoral arena (Gunnarsson 2019, 10), budget directives in the city of Gothenburg are 
only put forward once a year (Gothenburg City 2020). One budget is presented each year by each party. 
This makes the collection and narrowing of material easy. The budgets are collected from the official 
webpage of Gothenburg City (Gothenburg City 2020). The budgets collected were all the ones available, 
starting with the budget of 2013 and ending with the budget from 2020. This gives a good time span for 
the thesis: It covers two elections as well as time before, between and after the elections.  
There will be an exception to this. To cover for the year 2018 for the Democrats, opinion articles written 
by the party have been collected. These articles have been included so that the thesis also can cover the 
campaign for the Democrats3, and what issues the party focuses on.  
The opinion articles have all been published in the local newspaper Göteborgs-Posten, which is one of 
the largest newspapers in Sweden. They can be found on the webpage of the Democrats, and are 
published between the 1st of January until the 8th of September, which is the day before the election. 
Other forms of material were considered. On the Democrat’s webpage, they also present a “living 
document”, which essentially is a document they constantly revise. In this document they outline their 
major political goals. However, as it’s a “living” document, it’s impossible to know the exact date of 
when a policy was written and included in the document. Therefore, it’s unsuitable as material for this 
thesis. Because of this, the opinion articles are a more suitable choice, as the Democrats argue for 
specific policies through them. 
 
3 Because they weren’t elected to the city council until 2018, they have no directive that covers this year.  
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Göteborgs-Posten was chosen because the Democrats published their major debate articles there. It’s 
one of the largest newspapers in Sweden, and the largest in Gothenburg. This makes it a relevant source 
for information (Kantar Sifo 2020).  
  
The table below shows details for the budget directives. The letter “X” means that a directive is 
available, whereas the “- “ means that it’s missing.  
Table 2: Available budget directes 
 Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
Party          
Dems  - - - - - - X X 
Soc.Dem  X X X X X X X X 
Mod.Par  X X X X X X X X 
 
 
Quantitative content analysis 
This thesis has opted for the choice of a quantitative content analysis. As Esaiasson et al (2017) writes, 
quantitative content analysis is the study of some form of content – in this case, textual content – which 
can be quantified. Furthermore, it’s a useful tool when asking questions about the frequency of different 
categories in a vast amount of material (Esaiasson et al 2017, 198). This makes a quantitative content 
analysis a useful tool for this thesis, as proposals can be quantified. As this is central to both the method 
and the thesis, it becomes possible through a content analysis to study questions about saliency in budget 
directives.  
There are several ways of analysing text material. Today, it’s common to use computer assisted 
programmes to analyse policy positions through speeches and political documents (Klemmensen et al 
2009; Debus and Navarette 2020). These programmes help the researcher to analyse large amounts of 
data and decide what position a political party takes on issues. They are also useful for studies analysing 
social media (Hatipoğlu et al 2019).  
These studies place political parties along conflict dimension based on their position on policies. By 
analysing text, it’s possible to understand what a party wants and how it communicates its stances on 
issues. This thesis has a similar ambition. Quantitative content analysis has been used when analysing 
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is the method of choice for many research programmes, more prominently the Comparative Manifesto 
Project Database (CMP). CMP uses a special form of content analysis, using “quasi-sentences” as its 
code of analysis, it analyses statements and messages in political texts (Werner, Lacewell and Volkens 
2015, 6). In this thesis I use the methodology developed by the CMP project in order to quantify issue 
salience and test my hypotheses. 
 
Analysing, unitising and coding 
The analytical process of these types of studies is divided into two parts. First, the researcher needs to 
unitise the text, essentially finding out how many unique statements the party makes in its manifesto4. 
The second part consists of coding the statements (Werner, Lacewell and Volkens 2015, 5). Except for 
the chapters and sections headings, introductory remarks, statistics, and different kinds of tables of 
content, every textual part of the document must be coded (Werner, Lacewell and Volkens 2015, 6).  
The coding unit –unit of analysis – of the thesis is the quasi-sentence. A quasi-sentence consists of a 
“message” communicated by the political party. A basic rule of thumb is that one sentence equals one 
quasi-sentence. Sometimes, parties make several statements in one sentence, forcing the coder to cut 
multiple quasi-sentences (Werner, Lacewell and Volkens 2015, 6; Esaiasson et al 2017, 48). The CMP-
handbook gives the following example when to cut sentences:  
“We need to address our close ties with our neighbours (107)  as well as the unique challenges 
facing small business owners in this time of economic hardship. (402)” (Werner, Lacewell and 
Volkens 2015, 6). 
In the example, two different issues are discussed, creating two different quasi-sentences that need to be 
“cut” – meaning, separated from the sentence and coded – by the coder. If the example would only 
include one issue – such as only addressing the economic hardships for small businesses – it would only 
include one quasi-sentence. The coder therefore wouldn’t need to cut the sentence. For example:  
“We need to address the unique challenges facing small business owners in this time of economic 
hardship. (402)”  
It’s important that a sentence includes a statement. If it doesn’t, it will not be cut or coded as a quasi-
sentence. For example, a sentence will not be cut into a quasi-sentence if it simply calls out for a better-
run school: It need to include how, favourably specifying some factor of the school that needs to improve 
 
4 Or in this case, budget directives. 
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(such as better school lunch or working environment for the teachers) (Werner, Lacewell and Volkens 
2015, 7).  
To understand what code to use when coding, the coder must be as systematic as possible. Test runs 
were conducted before the actual coding started with the purpose of training so that I would be 
comfortable with the codes and understand them properly. When the actual analysis was conducted it 
was done in two steps. The first step consisted of reading the budget and cutting all the quasi-sentences. 
In the second step, the actual coding began. During the second step, I reread the directive and coded the 
relevant quasi-sentence.  
When assigning a code to a quasi-sentence, the coder sometimes needs to interpret what the message of 
the actor is. This puts a lot of responsibility on the coder as he needs to fully understand the statements 
(Werner, Lacewell and Volkens 2015, 9; Esaiasson et al 2017, 199). To achieve a reliable thesis, the 
author has constantly backtracked during the coding process so that a systematic coding structure was 
created (Esaiasson et al 2017, 64). I should note that budget directives are straightforward documents 
when it comes to their proposals. When interpretation was needed, only the manifest message was 
interpreted. No deeper interpretation was conducted. I did not try to understand and code the latent 
message of the directives. The analysis only concerns the manifest message, and the visible policy 
proposals.  
The upcoming section will discuss the codes and why they are relevant for this thesis. 
 
Variables: reasoning and introduction 
As earlier noted, niche parties usually advocate unconventional issues. As mentioned above, the 
Democrats in Gothenburg are primarily focusing on two issues: infrastructure and public administration 
(see below the result section). In this section, the codes for these issues will be presented, together with 
the codes for the issues found most important by the public opinion at the time of the election and will 
form part of my analysis. These issues are infrastructure, education, public administration, welfare and 
law and order. 
The issues are chosen on two different grounds. First, these issues reflect the public opinions most 
important questions at that moment in time (Andersson et al 2018, 132). This is with one exception as 
the integration issue is not coded here (see below). Second, the infrastructure issue and public 
administration were key topics for the Democrats and as a whole during the election (Näslund 2019). 
As I show at the start of the results section these are indeed two flagship issues which the Democrats 
campaigned on and will be the ones used in order to test my hypotheses. The remaining three (education, 
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welfare and law and order) form part of my analysis but mainly serve descriptive purposes. They also 
add important clues to the validity and reliability of this analysis as any alarming or counterintuitive 
findings on these could be cause for concern and help adjust the coding strategy.  
The issues together with their codes will be presented in the upcoming section.  
The codes 
In Gothenburg, the traffic issue together with infrastructure is of great local importance (Andersson et 
al 2018, 132). Having a local history, the issue was in the centre of attention with the announcement that 
the newly formed local party “Democrats” campaigned on the promise of stopping the national 
infrastructure project of Västlänken (ibid 129; Wannholt et al 2017). The codes used in this thesis are 
similar to the ones used by the CMP (Werner, Lacewell and Volkens 2015, 8).  The first variable 
introduced in the codebook is: 
• Infrastructure: Positive (code number 411).  
• Importance of modernisation of industry and updated methods of transport and communication. 
May include:  
- Calls for public spending on infrastructure such as roads and bridges. 
Code 411 will analyse quasi-sentences focusing on the willingness of public spending on infrastructure. 
In this thesis, “Positive” means that the actor writing the text is in favour of spending money on a specific 
policy. By gathering data on the number of proposals and messages containing a positive view on 
infrastructure, it becomes possible to analyse whether these have declined after the electoral success of 
the Democrats in 2018. Furthermore, this code also includes public spending on urban development. As 
an issue that has increasingly gained traction over time in Gothenburg, with several projects such as 
“Linbanan” and “Skeppsbron” being controversial, it needs to be included (Näslund 2020). Hereon, this 
code will be referred to as InfraPos.  
However, code 411 will not be sufficient to answer the questions asked in this thesis. What’s lacking 
from the codebook given by CMP is a code which captures negative proposals and policies concerning 
infrastructure. Therefore, this thesis has created its own code to achieve this purpose. The code –named 
411x – will be defined as an opposite of code 411. It will focus solely on infrastructure, as it was one of 
the most important questions amongst the citizens of Gothenburg 2018. Thus, the second code is defined 
as: 
• Infrastructure: Negative (code number 411x). 
- Calls for reduced public spending on infrastructure, such as roads and bridges.  
From here on, this code will be referred to as InfraNeg.  
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The third code introduced regards the municipal administration of Gothenburg. Apart from putting a 
stop to the Västlänken-project, the Democrats wanted to restructure the public administration of 
Gothenburg, and to improve its governance. Furthermore, they wanted to reduce the local corruption 
and develop the bureaucratic system (Andersson et al 2018, 129). Another reason for including this 
variable is introduced due to the diminishing trust towards politicians seen in the Swedish society at 
large (Andersson et al 2018, 133). This makes it interesting to see whether the mainstream parties have 
changed their position on an issue advocated by the Democrats regarding the public administration and 
their governance. The definition of the second variable is as follows:  
• Governmental and Administrative Efficiency (code number 303).  
- Need for efficiency and economy in government and administration and/or the general 
appeal to make the process of government and administration cheaper and more efficient. 
May include: 
- Restructuring the civil service. 
- Cutting down on the civil service.  
- Improving bureaucratic procedures.  
Code 303 will try to answer the questions regarding the policy positions of the Moderates and Social 
Democrats on the issue regarding the governance of the public administration. This code will be referred 
to as Admin. 
The fourth code regards the expansion of the welfare state, a key strategic goal for the Democrats up to 
the election of 2022. In their budget directive for 2019, the Democrats write that they want to redistribute 
1,4 billion Swedish kronor to the welfare sector (The Democrats budget directive 2019, 7; Rogsten 
2017). For the people living in Gothenburg the issue is also important (Andersson et al 2018, 132). This 
gives reason to include the code in the thesis. The definition of the third code is:  
• Welfare State Expansion (code number 504). 
- Favourable mentions of need to introduce, maintain or expand any public social service or 
social security scheme. This includes, for example, government funding of: 
- Health care. 
- Child care.  
- Elder care and pensions. 
- Social housing.  
From here on, this code will be referred to as Welfare. 
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Code 504 outlined above excludes education. Therefore, a code including education is needed to capture 
all the statements and quasi-sentences concerning the welfare sector. Thus, the fifth code is: 
• Education Expansion (code number 506). 
- Need to expand and/or improve educational provision at all levels.  
This code will be referred to as Education. 
Another issue outlined as important by the Democrats is expanding the police force (The Democrats 
budget directive 2019, 7, 20). They have argued for the importance of more police in society, for 
example calling for the reestablishment of a “neighbourhood police” (De Vivo 2017). Issues regarding 
integration and social questions are also important for the people in Gothenburg (Andersson et al 2018, 
132), giving reason to include this code). Hence, the sixth code is: 
• Law and Order General: Positive (code number 605.1). 
- Favourable mentions of strict law enforcement, and tougher actions against domestic crime. 
Only refers to the enforcement of the status quo of the manifesto country’s law code. May 
include: 
- Increasing support and resources for the police.  
- Tougher attitudes in courts. 
- Importance of internal security.  
This code will be referred to as Law.  
As is stated several times above, the reason behind including these specific codes is twofold. First, the 
Democrats favour these issues in their directives, giving them a lot of saliency. Second, these issues 
were important for the voters living in Gothenburg during the 2018 election. The six codes above were 
all among the five most important issues for the voters living in Gothenburg 2018 (Andersson et al 2018, 








Table 3: Summary of the codes. The table also shows examples of each code.   
303: Governmental and Administrative 
Efficiency. 
Need for efficiency and economy in government and 
administration and/or the general appeal to make the 
process of government and administration cheaper and 
more efficient. May include: Restructuring the civil 
service. 
Cutting down on the civil service.  
Improving bureaucratic procedures 
 
|“The respective boards and companies must conduct 
active efficiency work and evaluate ambition levels 
and opportunities for increased revenues” |(10-303) 
(The Democrats directive 2020) . 
411: Infrastructure: Positive.  
 
Importance of modernisation of industry and updated 
methods of transport and communication. May 
include: Calls for public spending on infrastructure 
such as roads and bridges. 
| “We want to develop and strengthen the Oslo-
Gothenburg-Copenhagen collaboration with a high-
speed line for trains” |24(411) (The Moderate Party 
budget directive 2013).  
411x : Infrastructure: Negative  Calls for reduced public spending on infrastructure, 
such as roads and bridges.  
 
|“The congestion tax will be phased out based on the 
reduced content in the West Sweden package” |(11-
411x) (The Democrats budget directive 2019). 
504: Welfare State Expansion. 
 
Favourable mentions of need to introduce, maintain or 
expand any public social service or social security 
scheme. This includes, for example, government 
funding of: Health care. Child care. Elder care and 
pensions. Social housing.  
 
|“Parental support is of great importance and needs 
to increase in socio-economically vulnerable 
districts” |29(504) (The Social Democrats budget 
directive 2014).  
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506: Education Expansion. 
 
Need to expand and/or improve educational provision 
at all levels.  
 
|“The expansion of the preschool will continue to 
strengthen the quality, especially through reduced 
size of the children's groups”|110(506) (The Social 
Democrats budget directive 2016). 
605.1: Law and Order General: Positive. 
 
Favourable mentions of strict law enforcement, and 
tougher actions against domestic crime. Only refers to 
the enforcement of the status quo of the manifesto 
country’s law code. May include: Increasing support 
and resources for the police.  Tougher attitudes in 
courts. Importance of internal security.  
 
| “Insecurity and fear of moving freely in the city must 
never prevail” | (168(605.1) (The Moderate Party 
budget directive 2018).  
 
A dataset on the coded sentences has been created in order to facilitate the analytical process and also 
allow for more transparency. The data will be shared upon request. Examples of the coded documents, 
the raw data, will be included in the appendix for further clarification of how the analysis proceeded.    
 
Discussion of the codes 
The codes Admin, InfraPos and InfraNeg are the ones that will be used to test the hypotheses. These 
were chosen after a reading of various sorts of material such as news articles, academic articles and 
political documents. I chose these two issues as the focal point of the study because I believe they 
were the main focus of the Democrats going into the 2018 election. As mentioned above, the 
Democats argues for a restructuring of the civil service in Gothenburg and for a stop to the West Link 
Project. As such, they are chosen due to their relevance for the Democrats. 
The other three codes – education, welfare and law and order – were chosen due to their relevance for 
the public opinion at that time. In 2017, the public opinion in Gothenburg put infrastructure as its most 
important topic (at 26%), education at second (at 24%), healthcare at third (22%), social issues at fifth 
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(18%), and law and order at sixth (13%) (Andersson et al 2018, 132)5. Welfare, Education and Law are 
included to give more substance to the analysis, and to include issues that would be applicable for all 
parties examined.  
 
Reliability and validity 
Before moving on, the question of reliability and validity needs to be addressed. Good reliability means 
that there are no random mistakes happening during the coding of the variables and that sentences 
including the same content are coded the same way (Esaiasson et al 2017, 64). It’s hard for a scientist 
to guarantee full reliability. When it comes to quantitative content analyses with multiple coders 
involved in the coding, it’s often the case that difference in the coding occur between the coders. To 
overcome this problem and test the reliability of the study, it’s possible to apply statistical tests. 
However, because there’s only one coder in this thesis, this is not possible. To avoid random mistakes 
and miscoding, the material has been reread multiple times, both during and after the coding. The author 
has backtracked to previously coded material to check that the same, or similar, proposals have been 
coded the same way. Furthermore, the data has also been scrutinized in its dataset-format, checking for 
misspelling and alike. Hence, the material and data has been checked several times for mistakes made 
by the author to minimise reliability concerns.   
The notion of validity is also essential to any academic inquiry and basically means that the scientists’ 
measuring what she says she will measure, i.e., how she operationalises her theoretical concepts 
(Esaiasson et al 2017, 58). I argue that the validity comes from using the codes developed by the CMP 
project. As a renown and tested methodology and codebook, the approach has been frequently used by 
academics throughout the years. Hence, it comes with an established codebook that lets me capture and 
code the necessary sentences from the material.  
Validity also comes from the chosen material. As I’ve argued above, the material chosen for this thesis 
is the best available option. This is true for both the directives and the complementary material for the 
Democrats 2018. The material captures proposals presented by the Democrats between the years 2018 
and 2020. Thus, it will help me test my hypotheses and eventually draw support for them. There is room 
 
5 At number four is integration at 23%. However, the responsibility of integration lies at the hand of the Swedish 
Public Employment Service, as it’s a centralized issue in Sweden (Wiesbrock 2013, 13). Because of this, it’s 
unlikely that the local parties will put forward any proposals concerning integration in their budget directives. As 
such, this issue has been ruled out of this thesis. Instead, law and order has been included.  
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for improvements, as there always is. Nevertheless, I argue that the material chosen for this thesis – 
together with the codes and methodology – is adequate and gives this thesis the validity it needs.  
 
Summary 
To summarize: This thesis aims to analyse quasi-sentences using a quantitative content analysis. The 
coding unit is quasi-sentences, and the codes constructed for this thesis are in line with the ones 
developed by the CMP. There are six codes in total. Due to the lack of electoral manifestos, budget 
directives put forward in the local parliament in Gothenburg will work as the material. As argued above, 
these directives are a suitable choice for the study. They specify both the goals and priorities for the 
parties, essentially working as strategical political documents. The time-period covered in this thesis is 
between 2013 and 2020 (for the mainstream parties), covering the two elections of 2014 and 2018. This 
gives a good analytical scope that is not too wide and not too small. The budgets are publicly available 
on the official webpage of Gothenburg City, making them available for anyone who wants to replicate 
this study. There is a total of 18 budgets, 2 for the Democrats from 2019 and 2020, 8 each for the 
Moderates and Social Democrats covering the years from 2013 to 2020. Because the Democrats were 
first elected to the municipal parliament in 2018 there are no directives prior to 2019. Instead, this thesis 
uses opinion articles published in 2018 to cover for the campaign. These are available at the Democrats 
webpage (Demokraterna 2020).  
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Results 
This section will describe and go through the empirical results and decide whether the hypotheses are 
supported. This will be done in three steps. The first step concerns the Democrats, the second the 
Moderate Party and the third the Social Democrats.  
The Democrats 
Table 4: Results for the Democrats 
Total number 





       
Party and 
year 





































































The table above shows the results from the Democrats budget directives and their opinion articles. The 
table shows the results in both percentages and total amount. This is to enable a better understanding of 
the data. To see how much saliency an issue is given, the data needs to be converted into percentages. 
At the same time, it’s important to know how frequent a certain code appears in the material, i.e., how 
many times a proposal is put forward. If a material has more quasi-sentences it will probably be more 
text and a longer read. As the table shows, the 2020 directive has more quasi-sentences compared to the 
2019 directive, being a longer text.  
The Democrats have two budget directives available for analysis as well as nine opinion articles between 
the 1st of January to the 8th of September. As mentioned above, the codes in the table were included due 
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to their relevance for the Democrats and the public. The Other6 category consists of codes not relevant 
for this thesis. Therefore, they will not be thoroughly discussed in this thesis.  
In 2018, going into the campaign, most of the QS were coded as InfraNeg, followed by Other, InfraPos 
and Admin. 30,6% of the QS were coded as InfraNeg, 22,4% as Other, 17,6% as InfraPos, 16,5% as 
Admin, 9,4% as Welfare, 2,4% as Education, and 1,2% as Law. In 2018, almost a third of the QS were 
coded as InfraNeg, making it the largest category that year. It’s followed by Other as the second largest, 
InfraPos as the third, Admin as the fourth, Welfare as the fifth. Education and Law are the smallest 
categories. 
It’s possible to see that the infrastructure and public administration issues are the focus of the party in 
2018. Especially InfraNeg is salient, but also InfraPos and Admin. Thus, - as argued above – the two 
topics where the most important for the Democrats during the election of 2018. 
In 2019 and 2020, most of the QS were either Other or coded as Admin. In 2019, 28,5% of the QS are 
coded as Other and 30,9% are coded as Admin. For the rest of the codes in 2019, 8,8% are coded as 
InfraPos, 5,2% as InfraNeg, 14,2% as Welfare, 8,2% as Education, and 4,2% as Law. In the table above, 
almost a third of the QS was coded as Admin. The second largest category is Other. The third largest 
category consisted of Welfare. The fourth largest category is InfraPos. The fifth largest is Education. 
The sixth largest is InfraNeg. The smallest category is Law.  
Whereas InfraPos and InfraNeg drops in saliency in 2019 compared to 2018, Admin increases to 
encompass almost a third of all the proposals. This was expected, as it’s shown above that the Democrats 
have moved away from the infrastructure issue to focus more on public administration. The drop could 
also be due to a fulfilment of the party’s goals, or that they failed to reach them. Either way, the party 
has clearly shifted their focus away from infrastructure towards public administration.  
In 2020, the results were mostly the same, where 28,6% of the QS are coded as Other and 30,6% coded 
as Admin. 8,6% of the codes are coded as InfraPos, 9,7% as Welfare, 17,3 as Education, 2,2 as InfraNeg 
and 3,1 as Law. Hence, the largest category in 2020 is Admin. The second largest is Other. The third 
largest is Education. The fourth largest is Welfare. The fifth largest is InfraPos. The sixth is Law. The 
smallest category is InfraNeg.  
A similar trend compared to the one between 2018 and 2019 is visible in 2020. The party’s focus has 
switched from infrastructure towards public administration as Admin remains stable on a high level. The 
 
6 This category includes sentences and proposals that concerns issues not relevant for this thesis. These issues 
could for example be democracy, migration, or labour issues. 
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main difference comes from InfraNeg, which continues to decline in importance for the party. This could 
be due to the factors mentioned above: Either a fulfilment of the party’s goals or a failure to achieve 
them.  
 
Summary of the Democrats 
Figure 2: Time-series graph over the codes.  
 
There is significant difference between the three recorded years. In 2018, going into the campaign, the 
Democrats emphasized infrastructure the most, shown in InfraNeg and InfraPos. In 2018, these two 
categories consisted of 48,2% of the coded QS. Much focus was also laid on Admin, as shown in the 
graph above. As discussed in the section above, this could be due to either a fulfilment of the party’s 
goals or a failure to achieve them. It could also be because infrastructure was mainly a “campaign issue”, 
meaning it’s an issue the Democrats mainly tried to attract voters with through an unconventional 
position. After the election, they could have dropped their position in order to be regarded as a more 
conventional party. Regardless, the two issues argued to be the most important for the thesis are the ones 
the Democrats focused on in 2018. This gives weight to the purpose of the thesis.  
In 2019, welfare issues were the third largest category. In 2020, it’s the fourth largest. Issues focusing 
on education took its place, moving from being the fourth largest category in 2019 to the third largest in 





























essentially taking more space inside the directive. This space comes from a decline in focus in the 
InfraNeg and Law from 2019 to 2020, as they decline from 5,2% and 4,2% to 2,2% and 3,1% 
respectively. InfraPos also declined 0,2% from 8,8 % in 2019 to 8,6% 2020. There is also a difference 
in the total amount of QS in the two directives. In 2019, 330 QS were coded. In 2020, there were 549 
QS coded, an increase with 219 from 2019. This shows that the 2020 directive was a longer text 
compared to the 2019 directive.  
As seen in the results, Admin increases from 2018 to 2020, while InfraNeg and InfraPos declines. At 
the same time, other codes such as Other and Education increases throughout the recorded years. This 
could be due to the Democrats trying to become a more “conventional” party by presenting a more 
complete policy platform. If this is true, the widening of policy positions can be understood as a tool to 
gather more votes in future elections.  
Regardless, it’s clear that the two main focuses of the party from 2018 to 2020 is infrastructure and 
public administration. These two has changed places as the most salient issue for the party. I will explore 
which one of the above hypotheses draws support by focusing on the reactions of the mainstream parties 
on mainly these two issues.  
 
Evidence for the hypotheses 
How do the mainstream parties respond to the Democrats on these issues? In this section I draw from 
their budget directives in order to explore which of my hypotheses seems to draw support. In the case 
of both the infrastructure and the public administration issues, increases in those codes will signify an 
engagement strategy (H2A) while decreases a dismissive strategy (H2B). However, in the case of the 
issue of infrastructure I try to go beyond this simple dichotomy since the separate coding of the tone 
(positive versus negative) provides an opportunity to get a more refined picture in the cases where 
mainstream parties have chosen to engage with the niche party in some way. Table 5 describes those 
options only for the issue of infrastructure. As mentioned before, increases in both negative and/or 
positive mentions will signify some engagement with the issue (upper left cell) while decreases in both 
a dismissing strategy (lower right cell). However, if the mainstream parties would increase positive 
mentions to infrastructure (at expense of negative) it could signify a more adversarial strategy. On the 
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other hand, if the Moderates and/or the Social Democrats were to increase their negative mentions to 
infrastructure (at the expense of positive) then this would hint towards a more accommodative strategy7 
Table 5: Adversarial or accommodative combination on the issue of infrastructure.    
 Increase Positive Decrease Positive 
Increase Negative  Engagement Accommodative 
Decrease Negative Adversarial Dismissive 
 
Furthermore, if H1 is to be supported these changes should be clear on or shortly after the election of 
2018. Thus, it’s expected that the changes the mainstream parties do are going to be visible between 
2018 and 2020. 
To summarize: It’s expected that the mainstream parties will react upon the success of the niche party 
in either of two ways. They are an increase the saliency by increasing the number of proposals in their 
directives effectively engaging with the niche party on the issue. Or they can decrease the number of 
proposals for a specific issue, making it less salient trying to shift the competition to issues that the 
Democrats have less ownership of. It’s expected that these changes in strategy will come after the 
election in 2018. In addition, as described in table 5 one could potentially differentiate between two 







7 Table 5 is a stylised depiction of the possible combinations which are not exhaustive. Positive or negative 
mentions on infrastructure could also remain stable/constant when one of the two increases. However, the focus 
here is on the actual increase (positive/negative) and interpretation of these “changes” in policy would be the 
same.  
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The Moderate Party – summary and findings 
Table 6: Results for the Moderate Party. 8 
Total number 
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8 A detailed overview of the results is to be found in the Appendix. 
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Figure 3: Time-series graph over the codes.9 
 
Throughout the eight directives, the Other category remains the largest category for the Moderate Party. 
Welfare and Education are the second and third largest categories across all directives. The size of these 
three categories varies across the directives. For the Other category, it starts at 43% in 2013, goes to 
33,9% in 2015 which is its lowest point, and reaches 49% in 2020 at its highest. Welfare starts at 20% 
in 2013 and ends in 2020 with 17,5%, its lowest point in the data. It reaches its highest point in 2015 at 
30,6%. Education had 20,7% in 2013, its highest number in the data. It ended with 13 % in 2020, its 
lowest number. Together, these three codes make up 79,5% of the QS in 2020. Admin is the fourth 
largest code in 2020, with 10,9% of the total amount of QS. It’s the highest percentage point recorded 
for the code which has been hovering around the 3-5 percentage mark between 2013 and 2019. InfraPos 
starts at 9,4% in 2013, records its highest point in 2018 with 10,3% and ends with 6,9% in 2020. Law 
starts at its lowest percentage point at 2,2% in 2013 and ends with 2,7%. Its highest point is in 2018 at 
3,9%. There are no QS in the Moderate Party’s budget directives that are coded with InfraNeg. 
The total amount of QS increases for almost every directive. There’s an exception in 2015, where a 
decrease in the number of QS occurs. Except for this decrease, the increase in QS shows that the total 
length of the directives increases for every year.   
Results show that the Moderates have deployed an engagement strategy regarding the public 
administration. The average value between 2013 and 2019 is 4,1%, which is a relatively low and stable 
 
9 The increase in Other from 2015 and onward could be explained by the dominance of the immigration issue 
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result. In 2020, as the table and graph show above, the code jumps to 10,9%, which is more than a double 
compared to the average value between 2013 and 2019. In the case of Admin, the data seems to provide 
support for H2A. 
Regarding InfraPos, it’s possible to witness a slight decrease in proposals concerning the issue. The 
average value between 2013 and 2019 is 9,6%. In 2020, it’s at 6,9%. It’s hard to decide what kind of 
strategy the Moderates deploy towards the Democrats on the issue through a quantitative content 
analysis. As the theory stays, a decline in salience indicates a dismissive strategy. At the same time, the 
position of the Democrats going into the election was to reduce spending on infrastructure projects. 
Thus, the decrease in proposals concerning InfraPos, for some, could indicate an accommodative 
strategy as the Moderates could move closer on the issue (by moderating their support for new 
infrastructure in their budget proposals). The code InfraNeg codes negative proposals, but as the table 
and graphs above shows, no proposals for InfraNeg were recorded. Thus, InfraPos serves as the main 
indicator for a shift in strategy. The lack of any movement in the InfraNeg code though, at a minimum, 
suggests that the Moderates are unwilling to show that they are in any way accommodating the concerns 
of the Democrats regarding large scale project in the Gothenburg municipality. So, the Moderates are 
not clearly adversarial neither clearly accommodative. Taken together, these results (the decrease in 
InfraPos and no mentions of InfraNeg), points towards a more dismissive (H2B) strategy on the issue of 
infrastructure from the sides of the Moderates.  
Both changes are visible after the election of 2018. The increase in proposals concerning the public 
administration as well as the decrease in proposals concerning infrastructure both occur between the 
years 2019 and 2020. Hence, the findings provide support for H1 regarding the timing of the effects. 
Furthermore, the strategy seems to be based on the type of the issue, as the Moderates adopt different 








The Social Democrats – summary and findings 
Table 7: Results for the Social Democrats.10 
Total number 
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10  A detailed overview of the results is to be found in the Appendix. 
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Figure 4: Time-series graph over the codes. 
 
While the Other category remains the largest category throughout the eight directives for the Social 
Democrats – starting at its highest point in 2013 at 56,6% and ending at its lowest in 2020 at 48,2% - 
the second-place changes between codes. Welfare is the second largest category up until 2020, when it’s 
overtaken by Admin. Welfare has its highest percentage point in 2013 with 22,2% and its lowest in 2020 
at 12,2%. Admin is at its lowest in 2013 at 5,2% and its highest in 2020 at 17,6%. There are small 
differences in Education and InfraPos. InfraPos starts at 4,9%, its lowest point, and ends at 8,5%, its 
highest point. Education starts at its highest point, 11,1% in 2013, hits its lowest point in 2015 at 8,5%, 
and ends at its highest point in 2020 at 11,7%. Law is the smallest category for the Social Democrats 
throughout all directives. It records it first numbers in 2019, which is also its highest point at 3,7%. It 
ends at 1,8% in 2020.   
Unlike the Moderate Party, the number of QS per directive doesn’t increase with every directive for the 
Social Democrats. Instead, it depends on the year. The lowest number is recorded in 2013, at 387, and 
increases until 2016, where a drop in numbers occurs. From 2016, it increases once again until 2020, 
where another decrease is recorded. The highest number of QS are found in the 2019 directive.  
The results above show that the Social Democrats have also adopted to an engagement strategy 
regarding the Admin. Probably even more so than the Moderates since Admin seems to be the second 
issue in terms of overall salience in their 2020 budget proposal. The average value between 2013 and 
2019 is 7,6%. In 2020, it’s 17,6%, which is more than a double compared to the average value 
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Regarding InfraPos, the average value for the Social Democrats between 2013 and 2019 is 7,2%. In 
2020, it increases to 8,5%, an increase of 1,3%. Even though this is a small increase, it can be viewed 
as a continuation of the previous policy for the Social Democrats. Compared to the Moderates they don’t 
reduce their relative number of proposals arguing for more spending on infrastructure. Instead, they 
slightly increase the number of proposals for InfraPos. As such, one can argue that the Social Democrats 
deploys an engagement strategy on the issue by continuing with their previous policy. However, there 
is not sufficient evidence to argue for a meaningful change. Instead, it seems that the Social Democrats 
keeps their old strategy on the issue. Again, as is the case for the Moderates there seem to be no InfraNeg 
codes in the budget proposals of the Social Democrats. Overall, there is no evidence for either 
hypotheses in the case of the issue of infrastructure. We do observe, though, a somewhat unwillingness 
from the side of the Social Democrats to engage with one of the niche party’s flagship campaign issues 
in the same way they did for Admin. 
The changes visible in the increased saliency for Admin occurs after 2019. Meaning, after the 2018 
election, and after the first budget directive presented by the Democrats, the Social Democrats has 
changed strategy. Thus, the data finds support H1  for the Social Democrats.  
The following section will discuss the results further and connect it with previous literature. 
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Discussion 
As shown in the results above, three hypotheses seem to be supported. This section will discuss the 
results and connect it to previous literature.  
Discussion of the results 
As shown, the focus on Admin coming from the Democrats made the Social Democrats and the 
Moderates to increase their focus on the issue, in the end making it more salient in their budget 
directives. The question arises to why the mainstream parties adopted an engagement strategy on Admin 
and not on InfraPos/InfraNeg. The answer can possibly be found inside the issues themselves. Where 
public administration seems to be more of a valence issue, an issue everyone agrees on (Evans and 
Chzhen 2016; Sanders et al 2011)11, infrastructure in Gothenburg is more of a positional issue (there can 
be a range of opinion for or against). This means that it’s easier for the mainstream parties to advocate 
for a more efficient and better-managed public administration, because the risk of losing voters to 
competitors is small. It’s difficult to see how even a small minority of the public opinion can be against 
these proposals.  
On the other hand, on the positional issue infrastructure, the risk of losing voters is higher, as the issue 
at that given time (yes or no towards the West Link Project and other major infrastructure agreements) 
consisted of a clear choice for or against something. This made the potential costs of choosing a new 
(possibly more accommodative towards the Democrats) position much higher. Furthermore, this could 
also be due to the fact that the issue is settled, meaning that the continuation of the West Link Project 
has removed the issue from political debate. Thus, any new positioning on the issue might be interpreted 
as irrelevant.  
Furthermore, the change of strategy could also be due to what kind of “threat” the mainstream parties 
perceive the Democrats to be. The mainstream parties’ decision to use an engagement strategy on Admin 
could be based on fear of losing more votes in upcoming elections. To not lose more votes, the 
mainstream parties might believe they need to revise their policy positions on specific issues, in this 
case public administration, and adopt similar positions as the Democrats. If this is true, the Democrats 
have managed to influence the political agenda of the mainstream parties. 
 
11 An example of a valence issue is economy. Everyone agrees on that a country needs a good and stable 
economy to thrive. Essentially, it’s an issue with a broad consensus on. This makes positioning on the issue easy 
for a political party, as the risk of losing votes is small.  
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It’s also possible to see in the results that the Social Democrats and the Moderates didn’t always adopt 
the same strategy. On the issue of public administration, both parties adopted an engagement strategy, 
but on infrastructure the Moderates seem to use a dismissive strategy while the Social Democrats seemed 
to keep their old positions on the issue. As scientists have shown before (for example, Bale et al 2010 
and Rooduijn et al 2014), mainstream parties differ in their responses. Even though they are influenced 
by their competitors they can still act on their own. This could be due to internal factors coming into 
play. As this thesis was not able – and didn’t have the ambition – to analyse what lies behind these 
changes, this could be something for future studies to continue with.  
Through the results it’s also possible to see that these changes occur between the years 2018 and 2020. 
As expected, elections work as a reliable resource for information about the voter’s preferences. As 
such, changes in party strategy are visible after some time, as the election result must be processed and 
analysed, and strategies developed based on the result (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009). It’s implausible 
to assume that a party changes its strategy the day after it loses an election. It takes time to gather 
knowledge and conduct the needed election analysis before the party decides to change its strategies. 
As the results show, time – usually years – is needed for change to happen in politics, as political actors 
are strategical actors that act and react upon their surroundings.    
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Conclusion, limitations, and future research 
As noted in the literature review, little interest has been shown with the regard to how mainstream parties 
and niche parties behave on the local level. This thesis has contributed by exploring the actions of 
mainstream parties on the local level and showing that they resemble those on the national level. 
Mainstream parties react and act upon the strategies of other contenders. Like parties on the national 
level, parties on the local level tend to adopt strategies and policy positions that are similar to their 
successful competitors.   
This thesis makes a number of contributions. First, it contributes and widens the understanding of how 
mainstream parties react towards niche parties. As shown in this study, mainstream parties react 
differently depending on the issue at hand. Many different factors could be the reason for this, such as 
what type of issue is in the limelight, what type of ideological family the mainstream party belongs to, 
or the characteristics of the niche party.  
Second, the thesis contributes to the literature on niche parties by analysing a party that focuses on issues 
other than immigration and the environment. The Democrats focus on infrastructure and public 
administration, issues that haven’t received as much attention in previous research. They are also more 
“local” in the sense that they focus on the infrastructure and public administration in Gothenburg. Thus, 
this thesis has contributed by studying niche parties that focuses on more unconventional issues. 
This brings us to the last and third area of contribution for this thesis: The local level. One of the main 
premises for this thesis was that not enough literature existed of how mainstream parties react towards 
niche parties on the local level. This thesis has started to fill this gap by exploring how mainstream 
parties resemble their national counterparts. Much like national parties, local mainstream parties are 
influenced by successful local niche parties. Local politicians are – like national politicians – strategic 
actors who evaluate and act upon changes in their environment. 
However, any inferences from this study should take into account various limitations. An obvious 
limitation with the thesis is that it can’t establish any causal relationship that shows that the niche party 
in question is the main agent of change for the mainstream parties. It can simply support the hypotheses 
through quantification and comparisons across years. More in-depth analyses that possibly combine 
quantitative and qualitative methodologies would be needed in order to support more robust causal 
claims. Unfortunately, this can’t be done in this thesis, but could be something for future research to do.  
A second limitation comes from the fact that the author was the only coder for the thesis. Because of 
this, no statistical reliability test can be conducted on the codes to ensure good reliability. For this thesis, 
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this is a difficult problem to solve. However, one needs to keep in mind when reading this thesis that 
mistakes may have been made. As I argue in the methodology section, I’ve done my best to avoid these 
mistakes.    
A third limitation is that it hasn’t been able to analyse contextual effects on policy shifts. This is 
somewhat related to the abovementioned limitation regarding causality. For example, the decrease in 
saliency for infrastructure proposals in the Moderates’ directives could be due to realistic factors, such 
as a continuation of the West Link Project. The issue might be considered to be somewhat settled. Indeed, 
even the Democrats seem to feature that issue less in their budget between 2018 and 2020. This would 
result in the issue being “dead”, which would mean a loss for the Democrats. As this thesis hasn’t been 
able to include any analysis of this, it’s an obvious weakness. Instead, this thesis has focused on how 
this change has taken place and across what issues. Regardless, if one wants to isolate and pinpoint a 
single factor that fully explains this change, one needs to look close into the actual post-election context.  
Future studies could dig deeper into the Democrats as a party and try to understand them more as an 
organization, as well as trying to understand why the mainstream parties changed in these strategies. As 
noted in the previous section, this thesis doesn’t analyse the intra-party processes that drives a change 
in strategy vis a vis a successful competitor. Future scientists could analyse these internal factors and 
gather knowledge on what made the mainstream parties change.  
As noted in the literature section, political parties usually change their strategies in accordance with their 
party family. A topic for future studies could be to decide what party family the Democrats belong to. 
In the end, this could also be a factor behind the different responses from the Social Democrats and the 
Moderates.  
Finally, future studies should follow the Democrats in upcoming elections and see how and if their 
strategies changes and what kind of implication it has on the mainstream parties. In the long run, the 
mainstream party’s decision to change strategy could result in further strengthening the Democrats. As 
shown above in the literature review, if a mainstream party tries to adopt a similar policy position as a 
niche party, it could result as a further indication of competence and legitimisation of the niche party’s 
policy proposals (Down and Han 2020; (Dahlström and Sundell 2012). By increasing their proposals 
for Admin  ̧ the Social Democrats and the Moderates could send a signal towards the voters that tells 
them that the Democrats are right in their critique towards the public administration. This could result 
in more voters leaving the mainstream parties for the Democrats, as their early position on the issue 
makes them look more competent. This is something for future studies to investigate and analyse.  
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Future studies can analyse this understanding in future elections. This will give a better understanding 
of how niche parties can change politics and political competition, as well as what consequences they 
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Examples of coded material 
The Moderate Party’s’ budget directive 2014, page 10. 
Göteborgs Universitet och Chalmers Tekniska Högskola är två av landets ledande lärosäten med runt 60 000 
studenter. Av dem är runt hälften inflyttade till Göteborg från andra delar av landet eller utomlands. Samtidigt 
finns endast 10 000 studentbostäder att tillgå. |Utöver att bygga fler studentbostäder vill vi stimulera till att fler 
studenter ska välja Göteborg genom att|35(504)12| bland annat införa studentrabatt i 
kollektivtrafiken|36(41113)| och erbjuda bättre möjligheter till praktik- och examensarbeten inom stadens 
bolag och förvaltningar|37.   
Den stora gruppen studenter är en möjlighet för Göteborg, som måste vara en så attraktiv stad att leva, arbeta 
och bilda familj i att studenterna stannar kvar efter avslutade studier. Idag sker en stor utflyttning efter studierna 
på grund av bostadsbrist och att det finns för litet utbud på arbetsmarknaden. Statistik för flyttningsnetton för 
Göteborg visar att staden haft en nettoutflyttning på sammanlagt 7937 personer i åldrarna 30-39 år mellan 2007-
2011. | Samverkan med näringslivet måste bli bättre på alla nivåer inom skolan så att den långsiktiga 
matchningen mellan jobb och utbildning blir bättre|38.  
UTBILDNING MINSKAR UTSATTHETEN  
Personer med hög utbildningsnivå jobbar i större utsträckning och har lättare att klara en lågkonjunktur. | Därför 
måste Göteborg fortsätta att satsa på att utvecklas till en stark kunskapsstad med Chalmers och Göteborgs 
Universitet i spetsen, |39(506)|samtidigt som insatserna måste intensifieras för att komma till rätta med 
kvalitetsbristerna i grundskolan|40(506). Skolinspektionens kritik mot grundskolan i Göteborg innefattade 
bland annat att fler än var fjärde elev i stadens grundskolor inte når kunskapskraven i alla ämnen. 
Skolinspektionens granskningar visar också på anmärkningsvärt stora skillnader i kunskapsresultat mellan de 
kommunala grundskolorna i Göteborg, både inom och mellan stadsdelarna. I två stadsdelar saknade över 30 
procent av avgångseleverna i grundskolan gymnasiebehörighet. Dessa unga löper särskilt stor risk att hamna i 
 
12 This quasi-sentence is understood as advocating for more housing, which categorizes it as Welfare (504). One 
could argue that this sentence should be categorised as Education (506), but as the CMP handbook clarifies, it’s 
the actual proposal – or “how” the improvement is going to happen – that should be coded (in this case, houses 
for students) (Werner, Lacewell and Volkens 2015, 7).  
13 This quasi-sentence is understood as advocating for an expanded infrastructure with its call for student 
discount. In this sentence, the proposal for improvement is the price reduction for students. Because it’s an 
reduction in the price for public transport, it’s understood as an expansion of the public infrastructure.  
 
 
långvarig arbetslöshet. | För att vända utvecklingen krävs snabba och omfattande åtgärder inom 
grundskolan|41(506). Det är 
 
The Social Democrats budget directive 2020, page 12.  
lagstadgad skyldighet att värna om de mest sårbara individerna och grupperna i samhället, som våldsutsatta 
kvinnor, hotade hbtq-personer och människor med missbruksproblem|24(504). Verksamheten ska vara en 
trygg, säker och medmänsklig del i dessa människors liv och i möjligaste mån bidra till deras aktiva deltagande i 
samhällslivet. | Nämnden har ansvar för stora tunga verksamhetsområden såsom boende och stöd för personer 
med samsjuklighet, inom missbruk och hemlöshet. Inom dessa områden är det särskilt stora problem med att 
säkerställa kompetensförsörjning och en god arbetsmiljö|25(504). | Det trygghetsskapande och 
brottsförebyggande arbetet, inklusive avhopparverksamheten, ska förstärkas och utvecklas och få en bättre 




» En återkommande stadenövergripande trygghetsundersökning ska införas i samverkan med 
stadsdelsnämnderna|28(605.1).  
» Lokala trygghetsvärdar ska anställas i samverkan med AB Framtiden|29(605.1). 
 » Ordningsvakter ska erbjudas en fördjupad utbildning med fokus på trygghetsskapande och 
brottsförebyggande arbete|30(605.1). 
» Insatser ska genomföras för ökad samordning av uppsökande verksamhet riktad till vårdnadshavare|31(504).  
» Utökade insatser ska göras för att påverka ungas attityder till narkotika|32(504). 
 
 
The Democrats opinion article published 2018-06-25 
Byt Västlänken mot snabbtåg till Oslo  
  
När Västlänken stoppas kan 15 miljarder kronor i statlig finansiering omfördelas till nytt dubbelspår till Oslo. 
Folket har redan sagt nej till att skövla vår stad|1(411x). 
Nu kan göteborgarna också säga ja till att halvera restiden till Norges huvudstad, skriver bland andra Martin 
Wannholt (D). 
 Det här är en debattartikel. Syftet med texten är att påverka och åsikterna är skribentens egna. 
 Under mer än 25 års tid har utredningar och samarbetsgrupper avlöst varandra. Olika försök har gjorts för att få 
till en modern tågförbindelse mellan Göteborg och Oslo. Men ännu finns ingen finansiering. 
 I dag tar de dryga 30 milen med tåg från Göteborg till Oslo hela fyra timmar. Med en utbyggnad på delsträckan 
mellan Trollhättan och Halden och vidare i Norge kan restiden halveras till cirka två timmar med vanliga 
snabbtåg|2(411). 
 Detta skapar helt nya möjligheter för göteborgarna och alla som arbetspendlar men också för hela näringslivet. 
Möjligheten till dagsturer mellan städerna gynnar turismens utveckling och ett utbyggt dubbelspår stärker 
Göteborgs hamn som Skandinaviens nav för godstransporter|3. 
Det är därför göteborgarnas demokratiska rättighet att välja bort Västlänken och i stället säga ja till sträckan 
Göteborg-Oslo|4(411x). 
 Tidiga kostnadsberäkningar för utbyggnad på den svenska sidan ligger på cirka 15 miljarder kronor, och på den 
norska sidan finns redan utbyggnadsplaner för delen mellan Oslo och Halden. 
 När avtalen om Västlänken hävs kan vi omfördela tågtunnelns investeringsmedel som finns avsatta i den 
nationella infrastrukturplanen. Dysterkvistar kommer snabbt påstå att det minsann inte går. Men självklart går 
det att byta ut en dålig investering mot en riktigt bra. Västlänken förlänger restiden för många medan ett nytt 
dubbelspår i stället halverar resans tid till Norges huvudstad. För oss i Demokraterna är valet enkelt. 
 Västlänken det mest olönsamma projektet 
 Västlänken är Sveriges mest olönsamma projekt. För göteborgarna innebär det en söndergrävd och skövlad stad. 
Enligt miljöförvaltningen ger tågtunneln inte heller någon mätbar förbättring av trafiksituationen i Göteborg. 
Men inte minst så saknar Västlänken folkligt stöd. 
 Det är därför göteborgarnas demokratiska rättighet att välja bort Västlänken och i stället säga ja till sträckan 
Göteborg-Oslo|5(411x). 
Den 9 september får alla boende i Göteborg och Västra Götaland möjlighet att välja: Vill vi åka snabbtåg till 
Oslo eller i en omvägstunnel i leran under vår fina stad? Valet är ditt. 
 
 
Results explained in detail for the mainstream parties 
Result for the Moderates 
The Moderates has eight budget directives available for analysis. The first directive of 2013 consists of 
405 QS. 43% of them were Other, 4,7% coded as Public, 9,4% as InfraPos, 20% as Welfare, 20,7% as 
Education and 2,2% as Law. There are no QS coded as InfraNeg. Thus, the largest category of codes is 
Other. The second largest is Education. The third largest is Welfare. The fourth largest is InfraNeg. 
The fifth Public, while the smallest category is Law.  
In 2014, 432 QS were coded. 41,7% were Other, 3,2% as Public, 10,2% as InfraPos, 22,9% as 
Welfare, 19,4% as Education, and 2,5% as Law. Once again, there are no QS coded as InfraNeg. The 
Other category is the largest category in 2017. The second largest are again Welfare. The third largest 
Education. The fourth largest InfraPos. The fifth largest is Public. The smallest category is Law. 
In 2015, 395 QS were coded. 33,9% of the QS were Other. 3,8% coded as Public, 8,9% as InfraPos, 
30,6% as Welfare, 20% as Education and 2,8% as Law. No QS was coded as InfraNeg. The largest 
category once again consists of Other. The second largest is Welfare. The third largest is Education. 
The fourth largest is InfraPos. The fifth largest is Public. The smallest category is Law. 
In 2016, 528 QS were coded. 37,9% of these were Other. 5,5% were coded as Public, 8,7% as 
InfraPos, 27,8% as Welfare, 17% as Education and 3% as Law. No QS were coded as InfraNeg. Thus, 
the largest category was Other. The second largest is Welfare. The third largest is Education. The 
fourth largest is InfraPos. The fifth largest category is Public. The smallest category is Law.  
In 2017, 597 QS were coded from the material. 36% of the QS were Other. 4% were coded as Public, 
9,4% as InfraPos, 28,8% as Welfare, 18,6% as Education, and 3,2% as Law. No QS were coded as 
InfraNeg. The largest category in 2017 consists of Other. The second largest is again Welfare. The 
third is Education. The fourth InfraPos. The fifth Public. Again, the smallest category is Law. 
In 2018 directive, 698 QS were coded. 39,7% of these were Other. 3,6% were coded as Public, 10,3% 
as InfraPos, 25,9% as Welfare, 16,6% as Education and 3,9% as Law. No QS were coded as InfraNeg. 
The largest category of codes consists of Other. The second largest is Welfare. The third largest is 
Education. The fourth largest is InfraPos. The fifth largest is Law. In 2018, the smallest category of 
codes is Public.  
In 2019, 788 QS were coded. 41% of these were Other. 3,6% were coded as Public, 10,2% as 
InfraPos, 25,1% as Welfare, 17% as Education and 3% as Law. No QS were coded as InfraNeg. In 
 
 
2019, the largest category of QS remains Other. The second largest is Welfare. The third largest is 
Education. The fourth largest is InfraPos. The fifth largest is Public. The smallest category is Law.  
In 2020, 1165 QS were coded. 49% of the QS were Other. 10,9% of the QS were coded as Public, 
6,9% as InfraPos, 17,5% as Welfare, 13% as Education and 2,7% as Law. In 2020, no QS were coded 
as InfraNeg. The largest category consists of Other. The second largest is Welfare. The third largest is 
Education. The fourth largest is Public. The fifth largest is InfraPos. The smallest category in 2020 is 
Law.  
 
Result for the Social Democrats 
Just like the Moderate Party, the Social Democrats has eight budget directives accessible for the 
analysis. The first directive of 2013 has 387 QS. Of these, 56,6% were coded as Other. 5,2% of the 
remaining QS were coded as Public, 4,9% as InfraPos, 22,2% as Welfare and 11,1% as Education. No 
QS were coded as InfraNeg or Law. The largest category of codes is Other. The second largest is 
Welfare. The third largest is Education. The fourth largest is Public. The smallest code is InfraPos.  
In 2014, 500 QS were coded. 53% of the QS was Other. 8,6% of the QS were coded as Public, 7,4% 
as InfraPos, 21,2% as Welfare, 9,8% as Education. No QS were coded as InfraNeg or Law. The 
largest category of QS in the directive is Other. The second largest is Welfare. The third largest is 
Education. The fourth largest is Public. The smallest category is InfraPos.  
In 2015, 564 QS were coded as Other. 54,4% of the coded QS were coded as Other. 8,3% are coded as 
Public, 7,8% as InfraPos, 22% as Welfare, and 8,5% as Education. No QS were coded as InfraNeg or 
Law. The largest category in 2015 is Other. The second largest is Welfare. The third largest is 
Education. The fourth largest is Public. The smallest category is InfraPos.  
In 2016, 500 QS were coded. Of the coded QS, 52% were coded as Other. 8,4% were coded as Public, 
8,2% as InfraPos, 21,2% as Welfare, 10,2% as Education. No QS were coded as InfraNeg or Law. The 
largest category in 2016 consists of Other. The second largest is Welfare. The third largest is 
Education. The fourth largest is Public. The smallest category is InfraPos.  
In 2017, 517 QS were coded. 57,1% of these were coded as Other. 8,7% are coded as Public, 7,2% as 
InfraPos, 17,6% as Welfare, and 9,5% as Education. None of the QS were coded as InfraNeg or Law. 
In 2017, the largest category of QS is Other. The second largest is Welfare. The third largest is 
Education. The fourth largest is Public. The smallest category is InfraPos.  
 
 
In 2018, 601 QS were coded. 56,7% of the coded QS were codes as  Other. 7,7% were coded as 
Public, 7,5% as InfraPos, 17,6% as Welfare and 10,5% as Education. None of the QS were coded as 
InfraNeg or Law. The largest category of QS in 2018 is Other. The second largest is Welfare. The 
third largest is Education. The fourth largest is Public. The smallest category of codes is InfraPos.  
In 2019, 615 QS were coded. 56,1% of the QS were coded as Other. 6,3% were coded as Public, 7,6% 
as InfraPos, 15% as Welfare, 11,2% as Education and 3,7% as Law. None of the QS were coded as 
InfraNeg. In 2019, the largest category of QS were coded as  Other. The second largest category is 
Welfare. The third largest is Education. The fourth largest is InfraPos. The fifth largest category is 
Public. The smallest category is Law.  
In 2020, 564 QS were coded. 48,2% of these were Other. 17,6% of the QS were coded as Public, 8,5% 
as InfraPos, 12,2% as Welfare, 11,7% as Education and 1,8% as Law. None of the QS were coded 
InfraNeg. The largest category in 2020 consists of Other. The second largest consists of QS coded as 
Public. The third largest is Welfare. The fourth is Education. The fifth largest category is InfraPos. 
The smallest category is Law.  
 
